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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Hll'HAHD .T. YOUNG, 
Plai11tiff a11d .Appellant, I 
vs . 
· Case No . 
.J l'LIA l\l. HAHNE Y and L:TAH 10519 
FARl\I llUREAU INSURANCE \: 
CO~IP ANY, a corporation, \ 
Defendants and Respo11dcnts. I 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
and Brief in Support Thereof 
COMES NO"r the plaintiff and appellant herein 
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a 
rehearing in the above-entitled case. It is appellant's 
position that this Court's decision affirming dismissal 
of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company from the 
case is contrary to la\Y and should be reversed and this 
petition is based 011 the following: 
1 
POINT I 
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THIS 
COURT FAILS TO CORRECTLY INTER- , 
PRET THE LANGUAGE AND MEANING OF 
RULES 18 AND 20, U.R.C.P. AND IS A DE-
NIAL TO PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS OF 1 
LAW. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
POINT I 
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THIS 
COURT FAILS TO CORRECTLY INTER- 1 
PRET THE LANGUAGE AND MEANING O:F ' 
RULES 18 AND 20, U.R.C.P. AND IS A DE-
NIAL TO PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS OF 
LAW. 
The underlying theory upon which the present 
decision rests appears to be that juries cannot be trusted 
to be impartial toward insurance companies and that 
the courts therefore should not permit suit against an 
insurer even in a case where it has expressly bound 1 
itself by _contract to pay damages suffered by an in- , 
jured party. 
This brings up some very vital questions: \Vhat 
authority do the courts have for selecting the cases or , 
class of cases which juries should be considered dis-
2 
q ual died to impartially try? If one court believes 
that jurors are prejudiced against insurance companies, 
another court may belieYe that jurors are prejudiced 
against railroad companies or manufacturing compa-
nies or great industrial organizations or persons of 
great wealth or persons of a different race or color or 
religion. Shall the court then deny the right of jury 
trial as against such defendants~ If such a person or 
rnrporation or associatiou has contracted to pay a 
debt owing by another party, will the court say the 
beneficiary will not be permitted to sue on such con-
tract? Or ·will it say that the plain 'vording of Rules 
18 and 20 must be interpreted as containing an im-
plied exception to protect such individuals or organi-
zations against being joined in a suit with the original 
debtor? Or if an insurance company or great corpo-
ration or rich individual or person of color has be-
come surety on a note or contract of another party, 
will the courts be justified in reading into Rule 18 
or Rule 20 an exception to prevent suit against the 
surety until after judgment against the principal 
obligor? If so, where is authority given in the law to 
confer such a discretion or power upon the courts '1 
ls the right to jury trial a right which is subject to 
discretion of the court? If Rules 18 and 20 'vere adopt-
ed with a view to anJidance of multiplicity of trials 
and bringing all interested partie-, before the court 
in one action, should it he thought that the rule makers 
had i~1 mind an undisclosed intention to protect in-
sur~mce companies, or any other class of persons or 
3 
companies, from being subject to the plain wording 
of these rules? 
If appellant's counsel in their former brief failed 
to bring out clearly to the court that the case now before 
the court is unmistakeably different from the cases 
cited by the court in its opinion, we then beg leave 
to make the point clear that in this case it is expressly 
alleged in the amended complaint that the defendant 
insurance company has bound itself by its contract, 
not merely to indernnify the insured against damages, 
but has bound itself to pay all damages suffered by 
any person through use of the automobile covered by 
the policy. That made a contract for the benefit of a 
third party. It is the kind of liability insurance which 
is imperatively needed in this day of high speed traffic 
and constant1y increasing accidents and tragedies on 
the highways. It is the kind of liability insurance which 
is contemplated hy financial responsibility laws. These 
laws were not adopted to protect or indemnify drivers 
against judgments. They were adopted to provide 
protection to persons injured by an operator of a 
motor vehicle. Therefore, when an insurer binds itself 
by its contract to pay damages suffered by the injured 
person, what law or logic can forbid the injured person 
the right to sue the insurer directly? Or to join the 
insurer with the tort-feasor in a suit to recover dam· 
ages? Can it be said that such a suit is merely a suit 
to determine negligence or liability of the tort-f easor 
and that the existence of insurance and the insolvency 
of the tort-feasor are entirely immaterial? Does the 
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eoml reali,,,<· that the trial eourt so ruled, and that this 
eourt is upholding this ruling in the preseut opinion 1 
Ilas the eomt forgotten what was at least intimated in 
the case of .Ellis v. Gilbert, Hl U.2d 189; 429 P.2d 39, 
that the object and purpose of a suit such as this is 
not merely to determine the question of negligence 
but to reeovcr <lamages ( And, if the tort-feasor is 
iusolvent, can any good reason be given for refusing 
to allow the injured person to join a party who has 
houucl itself by contract to pay such damages? 
This brings us back to the point made in our 
former brief that the only possible ground 'vhich can 
be urged under present rules to prevent joinder of an 
insurer with the tort-feasor in an action for damages 
i~ that the policy of insurance contains a "no action 
dause." There is no discussion of this point in the 
eourt's opinion. And no discussion of appellant's con-
tention that the defeudant insurance company is estop-
pe<l to claim the benefit of such a clause by reason of 
a contrary clause which binds the insurer to defend 
au~' actiou brought against the insured. And no dis-
cussion of the further point that the company has 
elected to take over defense of the action-and was not 
made a defendant until after it had so elected and 
had taken control of the defense of the action. 
Furthermore there is no discussion of fundamental 
constitutional questions to which the attention of the 
court was irrdtecl in appellant's former brief. Nothing 
is said as to the con::;titutional right of equal access 
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to the courts and that the courts shall be open for 
redress of grievances. It is not asserted either by the 
court or by the opposing counsel that the refusal of 
the defendant insurance company to pay damages, 
which by its contract it had agreed to pay, does not 
constitute a "grievance" within the intent of the con-
stitutional provision. Nothing is said as to the con-
stitutional or statutory right to jury trial, or the right 
asserted by plaintiff to enforce a contract made for his 
benefit by due process of law. Nothing is said as to the 
constitutional provision that the right to recover dam-
ages for wrongful death shall never be abrogated. 
The opinion appears to stand upon the sole ground that 
the courts have decided that juries cannot be trusted 
to be impartial toward insurance companies-and that 
such decisions are binding upon the court regardless 
of facts which are pleaded in this case-and admitted 
by the pleadings of the defendants - which unques-
tionably distinguish this case from the class of cases 
ref erred to in the opinion and in the respondent's brief. 
It is not shown in the record before the court 
whether or not the insurance policy herein involved 
contains a "no action clause." But in order to forestall 
a second appeal, counsel for appellant in their former 
brief, expressly requested the court to assume, for the 
purpose of' this appeal, that the policy contains such 
a clause. 
Respondent's counsel, in their brief, passed over 
this point \Vith the very casual comment that the no 
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action clause is not a part of the record and that "even 
if it were, the general rule is contrary to the position 
urged by appellant." Respondent then cited 15 A.L.R. 
7G3 as follows: 
"The validity of a clause in a casualty insur-
ance policy that no action shall be instituted 
against an insurer until the liability of the in-
sured shall have been determined by a final judg-
ment or by agreement of the parties has gen-
erally been upheld." 
It will be noted that nothing is there said as to 
the effect of the no action clause in a case where the 
insurer has also reserved the right to defend and where, 
as here, it has taken charge of and is conducting the 
defense. It should further be noted that this point is 
nut involved in nor referred to in any of the cases cited 
lJIJ respondents. Counsel for appellant has found no 
case in which a court has held that the no action clause 
forbids impleading the insurer as a defendant where 
it has reserved the right to defend and has exercised 
such right. It is submitted that no such case can be found 
and that the court should not uphold such inconsistent 
and arbitrary contract arrangements. 
It has repeatedly been held by the courts in inter-
preting Rule 14 of the Federal Rules that the "no 
action clause" in liability insurance policies cannot be 
used to prevent an insured when sued in a negligence 
action from impleading the insurer in such action. 
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 
IA ( 1960) Sec. 426.3, discusses the matter as follows: 
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"~lay a def eudant in a negligeuee action im-
p lead his liability insurer under Rule 14. This 
q uestiou which has been much discussed is i11 
fact uot <lifi'ieult. lloth on principle and ou 
authority it is clear that the answer must be in 
tlre affi~mative." 
"The argument has been adrnuced that al-
though implea<ler of an insurer may be proper 
in the abstract, still it is not permissible where 
the policy of insurance contains a "no-action 
clause" ... It is apparent that such clauses are 
inconsistent with Huie 14. The cases are agreed 
that lhe rule rather than the policy provision is 
controlling. The leading case is .Jordan v. Ste-
phens. 
In that case it is said: 
The no-action clause is directly opposed to 
Rule U. It poses a question as to whether the 
courts should permit litigants to circumvent rules 
of court by contractual arrangements. Rule H 
\Vas promulgated not for the purpose of serving 
litigants but as a \vise exposition of public policy. 
The object of the rule was to facilitate litigation, 
to save costs, to bring all the litigants into one 
proceeding, and to dispose of an entire matter 
without the expense of many suits and many 
trials. The uo.-nction clause of the policy is 
neither helpful to the third party defendant. to 
the courts, nor generally, is it in the interest of 
. the public welfare. Its object is to put weights 
on the already slow feet of justice . .J ordau Y. 
Stephens, 7 FHD HO, (D.C. l\Io. Hl.J.5). 
"THIS Appears to represent what is now 
the settled Yiew." 
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Appellant submits that the right of equal access 
to the courts is a sacred and inherent and fundamental 
right. The right is violated when a person, who is a 
real party defendant in interest, is permitted to come 
into court and conduct defense of an action behind a 
shield of secrecy. Any contract provision in a liability 
insurance policy which purports to give a person such 
a right is not only against public policy but is an at-
tempt to deprive the injured party of a fundamental 
constitutional right. 
''It is a general principle that persons who 
are not parties to a suit have no standing in 
court to enable them to take part in or control 
the proceedings." Ann. Cas. 1913 D. 1031. 
"Persons who are not parties of record to a 
suit have no standing therein to take part or 
control the proceedings." 39 Am. J. 928 Sec. 
55 n. 17. 
"A stranger to an action can take no part 
therein except to intervene or to make an appli-
cation to become a party thereto." 67 CJS 977 
Sec. 53 ( e) n. 27. 47 C.J. 96 n. 23. 
Greenwood v. Burt, 202 N.,V. 489, 162 Minn. 
247 
Hunt et al v. Hoerr, 80 N.,V. 1120, 78 Minn. 
281 
Pac. Dig. Key No. 38 "Parties" 
''Any agreement which tends to vrnrk a fraud 
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or an imposition on a court of justice is void as 
against public policy." 
17 C.J .S. 1087 Sec. 232 n. 39 
13 C.J. 447 n. 17 
125 p .2d 987' 989 
"All agreements, it is said, relating to pro-
ceedings in court, civil or criminal, which involve 
anything inconsistent with the impartial course 
of justice, are void, although not open to the 
charge of actual corruption, and regardless of 
the good faith of the parties.·' 
17 C.J .S. 594 n. 47 
"The principle has been applied to a stipula-
tion in a contract that a party who breaks it may 
not be sued. Or that a party may not resort to 
the courts." 
17 C.J.S. 1057 n. 59 
13 C.J. 456 n. 5 
"Contract provisions intended to oust courts 
of their jurisdiction in advance are void." 
17 C.J.S. 1069 Sec. 229 (1) 
"If the court has jurisdiction of an action, the 
parties cannot deprive the court thereof by con-
tract, and agreements made in advance of con-
troversy where the object is to oust jurisdiction 1 
of the courts are contrary to public policy and 
will not be enf arced." 
lb. n. 58 
Referring now to the observation made by the court 
that Rule 20 is "permissive"-·with the implication that 
the right of joinder granted by the rule is not a "right" 
but a favor or privilege ,vhich is subject to discretion 
of the court, appellaut submits that this does violence 
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to the language of the rule and is contrary to funda-
mental principles of statutory construction. A statute 
or rule which is unconditional language grants per-
mission to do an act ought never to be interpreted as 
being subject to the will or discretion of the court. 
Referring now to the comment by the court that 
''it is generally held that it is not proper to join an 
action such as the primary one here, which is based 
on negligence, and therefore in tort, with one like the 
claimed supplemental action which would be in con-
tract" appellant submits that Rules 18 and 20 were 
adopted for the express purpose of eliminating the 
evils and useless burdens of that former rule. Barron 
& Holtzoff has this to say upon the matter: 
"Under this Rule practically all restrictions 
on joinder of causes of action are abrogated. 
The Rule expressly permits either party to join 
in the same action as many independent or al-
ternate legal or equitable claims as such party 
may have against the other. Thus, where the 
parties are the same, there is no restriction what-
ever. The former limitations on the joinder of 
causes of action in contract and tort, or causes 
of action at law or in equity exist no longer. If 
the parties are different any joinder is permit-
ted in respect to claims which arise out of the 
same transaction or occurrence or series of 
transactions or occurrences, and involve a com-
mon question of law or fact." 2 Barron & Holt-
off 40. 
In this connection it seems appropriate to refer 
to the comment as to object and purpose of the new 
11 
rules wh[cl1 was made by this court iu the case of Ellis 
Y. Gilbert, J.29 P.:!d 39, 40: 
"Tlieir purpose is to make procedure as simple 
and efficient as possible by eliminating any use-
less ritual, undue rigidities or teclmicalites which 
may have become engrafted in our law; and to 
remove elements of surprise or trickery so the 
parties and the court can determine the facts , 
and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and ex-
peditiously as possible. In accord with this is 
l:he beginning policy statement in Rule 1 (a): 
'that the rules shall be liberally construed to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive, deter-
mination of every action.' " 
Appellant submits that the foregoing comment of 
the court in Ellis v. Gilbert should also be considered 
in connection with the discussion of Rule 18 (b) in 
the opinion in this case. The court here expresses the 
opinion that the makers of the Rule 18 (b) appear to 
have had in mind situations where one party has a 
claim against another, and where ultimate recovery 
might depend upon resort to property, which, by a 
fraudulent conveyance, or perhaps in situations of some 
generally similar character, was in the hands of a third 
party, in which case the sequel action could be joined. 
That view seems to be unjustifiably influenced by the 
reference to fraudulent conveyances in the title of the 
rule. It is definitely not consistent with the footnote 
appended to the rule which recites that: 
"The rule applies particularly to suits against 
a surety before determini1w the extent of the 
.. '-" 
liability of the principal." 
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Appellant contends that the title is no part of the 
act and that the broad and explicit language of the 
rule clearly embraces a situation such as shown in this 
case. Also that to restrict its application to cases in-
volving fraudulent conveyances, or similar situations, 
would be a clear violation of the general object and 
purpose of the rules as hereinabove set forth. 
We submit that the time has come to break the rule 
of masquerade wherein an insurance company which 
is the real party defendant in interest is permitted to 
conduct the defense and yet mislead the jury to believe 
that an impoverished or penniless individual is the only 
party chargeable with payment of the judgment. 
The time has come for courts to declare that juries 
should know the facts and not be deceived by a cloak 
of concealment thrown around the real party defendant. 
If insurance companies cannot trust jurors to deal 
with them without prejudice, why should a plaintiff 
not fear that a jury will be affected by undue sympathy 
for the defendant where appearances indicate that 
an impoverished individual must bear the burden of 
the judgment? 
'\Then no mention of insurance is permitted is it 
not probable that jurors will assume that there is no 
insurance and that they should trim the verdict out of 
sympathy for an unfortunate individual--or to make 
it more probable that the judgment will be paid? 
Is it not also verily true that insurance carriers 
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win many mistrials and new trials and many appeals 
by reason of belief of judges that mention of insurance 
in the hearing of jurors must be considered prejudicial 
error-even in cases where the real defendant in interest 
is an insurance company which is conducting and con-
trolling defense of the case and using its vast resources 
of legal talent and investigative machinery to defeat 
the claim of an injured party? 
Is it not time to unshackle the hands of trial judges 
and permit frank and sensible questioning of veniremen 
as to their interest in or connection with or prejudice 
toward insurance companies, and permit sensible and 
frank instructions by the court as to duty of jurors 
where insurance is involved? 
Respectfuly submitted, 
WILL L. HOYT and 
RA,VLINGS, 'VALLACE, ROBERTS 
& BLACK 
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